COMMENTS
THE COERCED CONFESSION CASES IN SEARCH
OF A RATIONALE
The rationale of the thirty-two coerced confession cases decided since
Brown v. Mississippi' has long perplexed both the Supreme Court and
the commentators. No exception are the three coerced confession cases
decided last term: Townsend v. Sain,2 Lynumn v. Illinois3 and Haynes
v. Washington.4 In all three cases the Court reversed state convictions
because they were based on confessions which the Court found to be
coerced. In Townsend a confession was held coerced because given after
the defendant, in great pain from narcotics withdrawal symptoms, had
been given at his request a pain relieving drug which, without the knowledge of the interrogating officers, turned out to be a form of "truth
serum." 5 In Lynumn, the confession was held coerced because made in
response to a statement by an arresting police officer that defendant's
children would not be taken from her by relief authorities if she "cooperated." 6 And in Haynes, although the defendant had willingly admitted his guilt on arrest, a subsequent confession was held coerced
because the defendant was told that he would not be allowed to call his
'7
wife until he "cooperated.
1 297 U.S. 278 (1986). Of the thirty-three cases the state conviction was sustained in
ten. In addition to the thirty-three, there are three other cases where the state conviction was reversed per curiam. A thirty-fourth is now before the court. United
States ex rel. Jackson v. Denno, 309 F.2d 573 (1962), cert. granted, 371 U.S. 967 (1963).
2 872 U.S. 293 (1963).
3 372 U.S. 528 (1968).
4 873 U.S. 503 (1968).
5 372 U.S. at 307-10. The Court remanded to the district court to hold a hearing
on the truth of the allegations in the petition for habeas corpus. The petitioner, who
had been convicted of murder and sentenced to death in an Illinois court, was a
nineteen-year-old heroin addict who had been described as "a near mental defective."
The petitioner made no claim of physical coercion.
6 872 U.S. at 581. The Court reversed a state conviction for unlawful possession and
sale of marijuana. The facts presented the usual pattern of arrest in a narcotics sale
case. See Comment, Administration of the Affirmative Trap and the Doctrine of Entrapment: Device and Defense, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 187, 149-59 (1963).
7 378 U.S. at 509. The Court reversed a state conviction for robbery. The defendant
was picked up about one-half hour after the robbery of a gasoline service station and
orally admitted the robbery to police officers while en route to the police station and
shortly after his arrival at the station again orally admitted the crime. The following
morning the defendant again confessed and signed a written statement, although he
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The extensive secondary literature emphasizes two possible reasons
why the Court finds it necessary to exclude coerced confessions. First, it
is argued that the Court excludes the confessions because they are unreliable evidence. And second, it is argued that the Court excludes the
confessions in order to deter improper police interrogation practices.
An important effort to clarify the controlling principles of the coerced
confession cases occurred in Mapp v. Ohio,9 holding inadmissible in a
state proceeding evidence obtained as the result of an unconstitutional
search and seizure. Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, found that
the coerced confession cases compelled the result reached in Mapp:
And nothing could be more certain than that when a coerced
confession is involved, "the relevant rules of evidence" are
overridden without regard to "the incidence of such conduct by
the police," slight or frequent. Why should not the same rule
apply to what is tantamount to coerced testimony by way of
unconstitutional seizure of goods, papers, effects, documents,
etc.?' 0
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, took issue with Mr. Justice Clark:
That this [right not to be convicted by means of a coerced confession] is a proceduralright and that its violation occurs at the
time his improperly obtained statement is admitted at trial, is
manifest. For without this right all the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony, whether by an accused or
any other witness, would become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling possible evidence of guilt, a
confession, would have already been obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police.
This, and not the disciplining of the police, as with illegally
seized evidence, is surely the true basis for excluding a statement
of the accused which was unconstitutionally obtained."
refused to sign a second statement. Later that same day the defendant was taken before a magistrate for a preliminary hearing. Admission of the written statement was
held error.
8 See generally, articles collected in A.A.L.S., SELECTED WRITINGS ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE AND TRIAL 854 (1957); Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession
Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 35 (1962). Suggestive of the
emotional responses which problems in the area of police interrogation can evoke is a
recent debate. See Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's
Stand, 53 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 85 (1962); Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties: Some "Facts" and "Theories", 53 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 171 (1962); Inbau, More
About Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties, 53 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 329 (1962);
Kamisar, Some Reflections on Criticizing the Court and "Policing the Police", 53
J. Caim. L., C. & P.S. 453 (1962).
9 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10 Id. at 656.
11 Id. at 685.
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In attempting to draw support for an exclusionary rule based on the
fourth amendment's search and seizure provision from the coerced confession cases grounded in the due process and self-incrimination clauses
of the fifth, Mr. Justice Clark was seeking the unified principle of ex12
clusion which has eluded the Court since Boyd v. United States. In that
case the Court held unconstitutional a law which compelled an individual suspected of violating the customs laws to produce his business
records on pain of forfeiting his goods. The Court observed that "any
forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is within the condemnation of . . . [the Constitution]. In

this regard the fourth and fifth amendments run almost into each
other."' 3 Although the remark may have been appropriate for the peculiar factual situation of the Boyd case, it is the thesis of this commerit
that efforts to provide a unified rationale for all the constitutional
exclusionary rules only make for analytical confusion. Clearly, the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States14 and Mapp v. Ohio15 is
grounded on considerations of deterrence.' 6 But it is here argued that
the controlling standard of the coerced confession cases is to be found
in the image of the accusatorial, adversary trial and that the objective of
the Court, as Mr. Justice Harlan suggested, is to prevent prosecutorial
circumvention of trial safeguards by means of out of court interrogation.
In order to argue this thesis it is first necessary to discuss the more traditional explanations for the coerced confession cases.
The "voluntariness-trustworthiness" rationale 17 is based on the argu12 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See, e.g., the effort of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952), where the Court held constitutionally inadmissible
in a state criminal proceeding evidence obtained by pumping the suspect's stomach.
"It would be a stultification of the responsibility which the course of constitutional
history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a man the police
cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach.
To attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers call 'real evidence' from verbal
evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions. Use of involuntary
verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even
though statements contained in them may be independently established as true.
Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency. So here,
to sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned by the court
whose judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law."
13 116 U.S. at 630.
14 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
15 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

16 See Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961): "For
I think it entirely clear that the Weeks exclusionary rule is but a remedy which, by
penalizing past official misconduct, is aimed at deterring such conduct in the future."
17 See, e.g., Inbau, Restrictions in the Law of Interrogation and Confession, 52
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ment that a confession which is involuntary should not be admitted into
evidence because an accused is likely to say anything his persecutors
want him to in order to stop the persecution.' 8 Considerations of reliability run through the cases. In Lyons v. Oklahoma19 it was said: "A
coerced confession is offensive to basic standards of justice, not because
the victim has a legal grievance against the police, but because declarations procured by torture are not premises from which a civilized forum
will infer guilt." 20 And in Reck v. Pate:21 "Experience however teaches
that confessions born of long detention under conditions of stress,
confusion, and anxiety are extremely unreliable." 22 But at times the
Supreme Court has considered it necessary to repudiate unreliability as
the foundation of the coerced confession exclusionary rule: "To be sure,
confessions cruelly extorted may be .. .untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of excluding confessions that are not voluntary does
23
not rest on this consideration."
This self-contradiction does little more perhaps than expose the
Court's own uncertainty. But although considerations of reliability have
influenced the Court's thinking, the chief difficulty with reliability as a
controlling rationale is that in many of the cases the excluded confession
Nw. U. L. REv. 77, 78 (1957); Inbau, Legal Pitfalls to Avoid in Criminal Interrogation,
40 J. CRiM. L. & C. 211, 212 (1949); McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in the Law of
Evidence, 16 Tax. L. Rav. 447, 452-53 (1938); Mueller, The Law Relating to Police
Interrogation Privileges and Limitations, 52 J. CRais. L., C. & P.S. 2 (1961); Ritz,
supra note 8, at 43.
18 It would seem that if the assumption of the "voluntariness-trustworthiness"
rationale--that a person is likely to lie to terminate the coercion-is valid, then an
unreliable confession is more likely when the coercion is physical than when it is
psychological. Yet this rationale was not mentioned in those cases where the coercion
was physical. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278 (1936). But cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953).
19 322 U.S. 596 (1944).
20 Id. at 605.
21 367 U.S. 433 (1961).
22 Id. at 447 (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182
(1953); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 422 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting in
part). Indicative of the Court's confusion is the first case where the unreliability
rationale was expressed, Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941). So unsure was the
Supreme Court of the reasons why it had excluded confessions in prior cases that it
made the following two statements on the same page of its opinion: (1) "The aim of
the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was voluntarily made is to exclude
false evidence. Tests are invoked to determine whether the inducement to speak was
such that there is a fair risk that the confession is false." (2) "The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent
fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false." Id. at 236.
23 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961); see also Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 324 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 n.2 (1949).
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had been shown to be reliable. In some the veracity of the confession
was substantiated by internal corroboration, the police checking out
details of the confession and finding them accurate. 24 In others the confession was substantiated by independent evidence of guilt.25
Yet in all these cases the Court still found that admission of the confession made the conviction a violation of due process. The "voluntariness-trustworthiness" rationale fails to account for these cases.
The current popular explanation for the "coerced" confession cases is
that the Supreme Court is seeking to enforce constitutional standards in
the interrogation of criminal suspects by depriving law enforcement
officials of admissible evidence when they overstep the line.26 The argument is that the Court has developed the exclusionary rule as a means
of deterring police interrogation techniques which violate basic standards
24 See, e.g., Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 615-16 (1961) (the suspect led the
police to hidden guns and pointed out where a raincoat had been hidden); Gallegos
v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 69 (1951) (found the corpus delicti on basis of defendant's
confession); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 60 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Such
corroboration consists in one case of finding a weapon where the accused has said he
hid it, and in others that conditions which could only have been known to one who
was implicated correspond with his story.'); cf. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597
(1944) (there was a prior admittedly valid confession).
25 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518 (1963) ("substantial independent
evidence tending to demonstrate the guilt') (indeed, one of the reasons for the
inadmissibility was that the confession was "unnecessary'); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372
U.S. 528, 537 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961); Blackburn v.
Alabama, 861 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) ("other evidence establishes guilt or corroborates
the confession"); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316 (1959) (there was an eyewitness
to the crime); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1958); Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 597 (1948); Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945). Although exclusion of an internally corroborated
confession is clearly at odds with a trustworthiness rationale, it should be noted that
exclusion of a confession where there is independent evidence of guilt is not necessarily so. This results from problems of trial administration. If the prosecution were
to attempt to overcome a showing that the confession had been obtained under circumstances indicating its unreliability by introducing independent evidence of the
defendant's criminal acts, then the issue on admissibility would coincide with the
ultimate issue in the case-the guilt of the defendant. If, on the one hand, independent proof of guilt less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt makes the confession
admissible, then the confession may come in for its independent impact on the
probabilities of the case. The introduction of a confession on such a showing might
still be objectionable on the ground that the practical impact of a coerced confession
on the trier of fact is far greater than any minimal probative value it might have.
But if, on the other hand, independent proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is
required to make the confession admissible, then there is no reason to admit the
confession.
26 See, e.g., Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48
Nw. U. L. Rv. 16, 23-25 (1953); Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States
Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. Rzv. 442, 443 (1948); Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The
Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CM. L. REv. 317, 343-44
(1954); Way, The Supreme Court and State Coerced Confessions, 12 J. PuB. L. 53,
55 (1963).
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Illustrative of this approach is Spano v. New

York 28 which reversed a conviction for murder. The Court said that
"the abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions . . .
turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while
' 29
enforcing the law.
But the difficulty with the deterrence rationale is that the test of
"voluntariness" is subjective.30 The question is "whether the defendant's
will was overborne at the time he confessed" 31 and is to be determined
upon the "totality of the circumstances." 32 Whether or not particular
police conduct amounts to coercion depends upon the individual characteristics of the suspect interrogated-his "power of resistance."8 3 Included in the factors considered are his age, 34 level of intelligence, 35
amount of education, 36 prior experience with the police,37 and his race. 38
27 See, e.g., Inbau, Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's
Stand, 53 J. CRiM. L., C. & P.S. 85 (1962); King, Developing a Future Constitutional
Standard for Confessions, 8 WAYNE L. REv. 480, 489 (1962); Maguire, "Involuntary"
Confessions, 31 TUL. L. REv. 125, 167 (1956); Mueller, supra note 17.
28 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
29 Id.
at 320. See also Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958); Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596 (1948); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940). But cf. Gallegos v. Nebraska,
342 U.S. 55, 70 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
30 See generally, Comment, Federal Constitutional Limitations on the Use of
Coerced Confessions in the State Courts, 50 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 265 (1959); Comment,
Justice Black-Inherent Coercion: An Analytical Study of the Standard for Determining the Voluntariness of a Confession, 10 Am. U. L. REv. 53 (1961). However,
there are some writers who suggest that the Court is really using an objective test.
See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 17; Ritz, supra note 8, at 43. The basis for this position
seems to be the occasional use of the phrase "inherently coercive" by the Court. See,
e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 442 (1961); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143,
154 (1944).
31 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); Leyra v.
Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949); Chambers
v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 240 (1940).
32 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568, 601-02 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 442 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957).
33 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois,
372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961); Thomas v.
Arizona, 356 U.S. 390, 393 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1957).
34 See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948);
cf. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948).
35 See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433
(1961); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957).
36 See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951).
But cf. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
37 See Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528
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These cumulative factors which determine the resistance of the suspect
are then weighed against the "pressure" exerted by the interrogators. 39
Among the factors which have been held to constitute police pressure
are physical brutality,40 depriving the suspect of sleep 4' or food,42 protracted periods of questioning,43 threats44 and holding the suspect incommunicado for a long period.4 5 If the pressure was greater than the power
of resistance, the confession is considered "involuntary." What constitutes
coercion for one accused will not do so for another because it takes
greater pressure to overbear the "power of resistance" of one individual
than another.
If the purpose of excluding coerced confessions is to deter the police
from violating the rights of the accused in interrogation, then one would
expect that those rights would be the same for all citizens. But instead
these "rights" shift from citizen to citizen.4 6 Such a shifting standard is
(1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959);
cf. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
38 See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560
(1958); Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957);
Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 (1951); Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742 (1948); Haley
v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
39 See, e.g., Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Thomas v. Arizona,
356 U.S. 390, 393 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 198 (1957); Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 71 (1949); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944).
40 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
41 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940).
42 Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
43 Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954);
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
44 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528
(1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
45 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961);
Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949).
46 One of the unresolved questions in the coerced confession cases is whether there
is any constitutional violation absent the introduction of the confession into evidence.
In Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) the Court upheld a conviction under
the civil rights act for biutal treatment of a prisoner during interrogation. The
reasoning of the Court suggested that the defendants deprived the prisoner of his
constitutional rights because any confession obtained would have been coerced. "It
is as plain as a pikestaff that the present confessions would not be allowed in evidence
whatever the school of thought concerning the scope and meaning of the Due Process
Clause." Id. at 101. But in Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948), the Court rejected
the contention that the extraction of a confession not introduced into evidence made
the conviction a violation of due process. "Petitioner also relies on Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596, in which this Court reversed a state court murder conviction because
it was . . . [coerced]. Even aside from the differing facts, that case provides no pre-
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not compatible with objectives of deterrence. As the law now stands the
police have little to lose from interrogation. They can apply increasingly
greater pressure until the suspect confesses. If the confession is admissible,
well and good. If it is not, no harm has been done since the police
wouldn't have been able to get the confession unless they had applied
the pressure. 47 Thus the Court's approach to a determination of coercion
48
is incompatible with a deterrence rationale.
The most satisfactory statement of the rationale of the Supreme Court
in holding "coerced" confessions inadmissible under the fourteenth
amendment is that the exclusionary rule is necessary to prevent state law
enforcement authorities from circumventing the safeguards of the accusatorial, adversary trial. For example, the effectiveness of the defendant's right to counsel 49 would be sharply reduced if the prosecutor could
obtain a conviction based on a confession extracted from an accused
held incommunicado. Two non-controversial assumptions made by the
Court lie behind this reasoning. First that the goal of our system of
criminal justice is to protect the innocent and convict the guilty, and that
this goal is best achieved by means of the accusatorial, 0 adversary trial.
Second, that the introduction of a confession into evidence has a powerful
impact on the trier of fact, substantially increasing the probabilities of
conviction. 51 The Court's acceptance of this second assumption is shown
by the automatic reversal rule-the admission of52 a coerced confession
can never be, in the Court's view, non-prejudicial.
cedent for relief to this prisoner since, as has been said, no confession was used against

him ...." Id. at 738.
47 An analogous point can be based on the fact that several cases indicate that the
intent of the law-enforcement authorities is not a factor in considering whether there
was coercion and whether the confession is admissible. See Townsend v. Sain, 372

U.S. 293, 308 (1963); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Stroble v. California,
343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952). But see contra, Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U.S. 426, 431 (1958).

Although problems of proof and a desire to make the police more careful might well
make extension of a deterrent exclusionary rule to unintentional conduct logical, the

distinction between intentional and unintentional police conduct would seem worthy
of consideration if the Court is in fact using a deterrence rationale.
48 Cf. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 158 (1944), where Mr. Justice Jackson,
dissenting, disclaimed the deterrence rationale. "We have no power to discipline the
police or law-enforcement officers . . . nor to reverse . . . [state] convictions in retribution for conduct which we may personally disapprove."
49 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.

45 (1932).
50 The cases often contrast the accusatorial trial with an inquisitorial system. See,

e.g., Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 50-51 (1962); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 446
(1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961);
Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54

(1949); cf. White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530, 533 (1940); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227, 239 (1940).
51 See Meltzer, supra note 26, at 326-27.
52 The automatic reversal rule states that a conviction will be reversed if an in-
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Brown v. Mississippi5 3 demonstrates that the novelty of the foregoing
statement is only in its articulation. There the Court said that "a
wrong so fundamental [had been committed] that it made the whole
proceeding a mere pretense of a trial and rendered the conviction and
sentence wholly void.' 54 In other cases the Court has specifically adverted
to the standard of permissible trial conduct as the test of coercion.
Lisenba v. California,55 although it resulted in an affirmance of the state
conviction, gives one of the clearest indications that the Court is measuring the circumstances under which the confession is obtained against
what can be done at the trial: "To extort testimony from a defendant by
physical torture in the very presence of the trial tribunal is not due
process. The case stands no better if torture induces an extra-judicial
confession which is used as evidence in the courtroom." 50 An equally
57
explicit comparison with the trial was made in Ashcraft v. Tennessee
which reversed a murder conviction:
voluntary confession has been admitted into evidence, regardless of any other and
independent evidence of guilt. Generally the reason for this rule is said to be that
because of the general verdict, there is no way to determine whether or not the jury
relied upon the confession in its guilty verdict. See, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528,
537 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S.
596, 597 n.l (1944). Contra, Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 190 (1953).
53 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
54 Id. at 286. But see Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases
in the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 35, 43-45 (1962), reading Brown ,
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), as excluding the confession because "confessions
obtained by physical torture are so inherently untrustworthy as evidence ....
"
In view of the extreme circumstances under which the confessions were obtained,
the Court probably did not consider it necessary to develop any single rationale.
Rather the whole proceeding was held to be void since the methods used were "revolting to the sense of justice." Id. at 286. Other cases hint at this visceral reaction
test of due process. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940) ("[N~o such practice
as that disclosed by this record shall send any accused to his death."); White v. Texas,
310 U.S. 530, 533 (1940). In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) the Court reversed
a state conviction for possession of morphine. Although there was no confession in
the usual sense, the evidence obtained by emptying the defendant's stomach was held
inadmissible since it was obtained by "conduct that shocks the conscience." Id. at 172.
L5 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
56 Id. at 237. The Court continued: "A trial dominated by mob violence in the
courtroom is not such as due process demands. The case can stand no better if mob
violence anterior to the trial is the inducing cause of the defendant's alleged confession.
"If, by fraud, collusion, trickery, and subordination or perjury, on the part of those
representing the State, the trial of an accused person results in his conviction, he has
been denied due process of law. The case can stand no better if, by the same devices,
a confession is procured, and used in the trial.
"The concept of due process would void a trial in which, by threats or promises in
the presence of court and jury, a defendant was induced to testify against himself.
The case can stand no better if, by resort to the same means, the defendant is induced
to confess and his confession is given in evidence." Ibid.
57 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
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It is inconceivable that any court of justice in the land, conducted as our courts are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to keep a defendant witness under
continuous cross-examination for thirty-six hours without rest
or sleep in an effort to extract a "voluntary" confession. Nor can
we, consistently with Constitutional due process of law, hold
voluntary a confession where prosecutors do the same thing
away from the restraining influences of a public trial in an open
court room.

58

Beyond these explicit references to the trial there is equally strong
support for the theory that the Court is imposing the image of the
adversary trial on the interrogation process in the emphasis of the cases
on the need for equality between the interrogators and the suspect.
Through the right to counsel, the adversary system seeks to guarantee
the equality of the adversaries. 59 Counsel are presumed equal. But if
this equality is to be guaranteed in the absence of counsel at interrogation, then the accused's ability to protect his own interests becomes relevant. In Gallegos v. Colorado0 the conviction of a fourteen year old
boy for first degree murder was reversed principally because for a five day
period "he was cut off from contact with any lawyer or adult advisor
.
.061
At no time did the majority opinion refer to the confession as
"involuntary" or "coerced," rather it said: "[V]e deal with a person who
is not equal to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the questions and answers being recorded and who is unable
to know how to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his
constitutional rights. .

.

. Adult advice would have put him on a less

unequal footing with his interrogators." 62 The confession was inadmissible because obtained where there was no equality between the adver58 Id. at 154. In Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 410 (1945), a conviction for
murder was reversed because a confession was admitted into evidence and "coerced
confessions would find a way of corrupting the trial ....." And in Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 236 (1940), the Court reversed the conviction because "due
process . . . was intended . . . to protect, at all times, people charged with or sus-

pected of crime by those holding positions of power and authority." From the fact
that the Court found procedural due process was intended to protect "at all times"
it can be argued that the Court intended to give the same protection at all timesbefore as well as during the trial.
59 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963): "From the very beginning, our
state and national constitutions and laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer
to assist him."
60 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
61 Id. at 54.
62 Ibid.
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saries.63 Also demonstrative are the cases where the dominant image is
of the "terrible engine of the criminal law" on the one hand, and the
lonely, uneducated "individuals who stand helpless before it" on the
other. 4 In Lynumn, the sole basis for holding the confession inadmissible
was that the police had told the suspect that her children wouldn't be
taken from her if she cooperated "while she was encircled in her apartment by three police officers and a twice convicted felon who had purportedly 'set her up.' There was no friend or advisor to whom she might
turn. She had had no previous experience with the criminal law, and had
no reason not to believe that the police had ample power to carry out
their threats."65 And in Haynes, notwithstanding the defendant's "prior
contacts with the authorities," the Court found that "he had 'no reason not
to believe that the police had ample power to carry out their threats' "
and that he could call his wife only if he "cooperated." 66 On the other
hand, in Lisenba v. California 7 where the defendant was questioned for
a protracted period, slapped by a police officer and subjected to other
illegal police conduct the Court held the confession to be uncoerced.
68
The defendant was "a man of intelligence and business experience"
and "exhibited a self-possession, a coolness, and an acumen throughout
his questioning, and at his trial ...... 00 Where there is sharp deviation
from the ideal of adversary equality because the suspect is young,70 naive
as to the working of the criminal law, 7' or of low mentality, 72 the Court
makes it impossible for the law enforcement authorities to utilize their
advantage by holding the confession inadmissible.
63 Compare Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), relied on in Gallegos. There the
defendant was a 15 year old negro, was questioned for 5 hours in the early morning
hours by relays of policemen, while his lawyer was refused admission to see him.
"[W]e cannot believe that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in such a
contest. He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of fear,
then of panic. He needs someone on whom to lean lest the overpowering presence
of the law, as he knows it, crush him." Id. at 599-600.
64 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 575 (1961).
65 Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).
66 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963).
67 314 U.S. 219, 228-41 (1941).
68 Id. at 229.
69 Id. at 241. See also Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), where the Court
first rejected the facts of police detention, of an admonition to tell the truth and of a
failure of prompt arraignment as sufficient to render the confession involuntary, and
then found that the denial of the defendant's request for counsel did not constitute
coercion. "It [a finding of coercion] is negated here by petitioner's age, intelligence,
and education. While in law school he had studied criminal law; indeed, when asked
to take the lie detector test, he informed the operator that the results of such a test
would not be admissible at trial absent a stipulation by the parties." Id. at 438.
70 See cases cited note 34 supra.
71 See cases cited note 37 supra.
72 See cases cited note 35 supra.
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The adversary equality theory results in the subjective test of involuntariness. The amount of pressure that the police can apply and the
devices that they may use in interrogating depend upon the ability of
the accused to withstand pressure. The subjective test is an equalizing
73
device-the weaker the suspect, the more restricted are the police.
The adversary equality theory is further illustrated by Crooker v.
74
California
holding that the defendant had no right to counsel at interrogation. In Crooker Mr. Justice Clark observed that a "state refusal of
a request to engage counsel violates due process . ..if he is deprived of
counsel for any part of the pretrial proceedings, provided that he is so
prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent trial with an absence of
'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.' "75 Mr.
Justice Clark went on to find that Crooker had no right to counsel because "the sum total of the circumstances here during the time petitioner
was without counsel is a voluntary confession by a college-educated man
with law school training who knew of his right to keep silent."7 6 This
appears to mean that the very factors which make a confession voluntary
also eliminate the right to counsel, that only when a confession is coerced
does one have a right to counsel at interrogation. But if the confession
is coerced it is inadmissible, and one has no need for counsel. The right
to counsel in Crooker is really part and parcel of the emphasis on
equality in the coerced confession cases. As long as one is a match for
his interrogators, he has no need for counsel. But if the accused is un77
equal to his interrogators, then counsel is needed to right the balance.
As a practical matter Crooker holds that there is no right to counsel at
interrogation. But it does so in a fashion which is in accord with the
accusatorial rationale for the coerced confession cases.
The Court's use of the image of the trial is also illustrated by the emphasis placed on the failure of prompt arraignment as a factor pointing
to the existence of "coercion." 78 The Court has held that there is no
74

See text accompanying notes 30-48 supra for a discussion of the subjective test.
357 U.S. 433 (1958).

75

Id. at 439.

76

Id. at 440.

73

77 The absence of counsel or friends during interrogation is often emphasized in

the coerced confession cases. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963);
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 55
(1962); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 632-33 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S.
433, 441 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 563 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352
U.S. 191, 196-97 (1957); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 561 (1954); Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596, 600-01 (1948).
78 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado,
370 U.S. 49, 55 (1962); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 631-32 (1961); Payne v.
Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 563 (1958); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1957);
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fourteenth amendment right to prompt arraignment 79 -but continues
to rely on prolonged detention as significant in the "coerced" confession
cases. Such a reliance flows naturally from the adversary theory. The
longer the police have to conduct an incommunicado interrogation the
greater their advantages over the suspect. At arraignment, however, the
suspect is advised of his rights, putting him in a better position to exercise them.
The rationale here urged as the one which best accounts for all the
elements of the coerced confession cases may be summarized as follows.
The accusatorial, adversary trial is the most effective means of accomplishing the goals of the system. When a confession is admitted into
evidence it has such a persuasive effect upon the trier of fact as to substantially determine the outcome of the trial. As a result the outcome of
the trial is substantially predetermined at the time the confession is
obtained. If the adversary theory is not maintained at that time, its
benefits are lost to the defendant and to the system. Therefore the adversary theory should govern the proceeding at which the confession is
obtained and no confession obtained under circumstances not incompatible with an accusatorial, adversary system should be admitted into
evidence.
The accusatorial rationale is not, of course, incompatible with considerations either of reliability or deterrence. To the extent that confessions which are involuntary are unreliable, reliability is furthered.
And to the extent that the police strive to obtain admissible confessions,
police excesses are deterred. But the central focus of the coerced confession cases is not on reliability or on controlling police conduct. It is on
procedural fairness in the particular case before the Court. It would be
a strange way of speaking to say that appellate courts reverse trial courts
to deter future errors by the trial judge. Rather, an appellate court reverses a trial court to ensure that the particular defendant in the case
before the court has been accorded equal treatment before the law. But
it cannot be denied that appellate reversals also have the effect of deterring similar future conduct by trial judges. The difficulty with the trustworthiness and deterrence rationales is not that they raise considerations
which are inapposite, but that they fail to account satisfactorily for all
of the cases.
The real problem of the coerced confession cases is not their theoretiWatts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 63-64
(1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 388 U.S. 68, 69-70 (1949).
79 Culombe v. Connecticut, 867 U.S. 568, 600-01 (1961) (Frankfurter, J.); Stein v.
New York, 346 U.S. 156, 187-88 (1953); Brown v. Allen, 844 U.S. 443, 476 (1953);
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 197 (1952); cf. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 822 U.S. 596
597 n.2 (1944).
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cal basis but their administration. A test involving so many different
factors and such difficult evaluations is inherently impossible of even
application. It would be a logical extension of the accusatorial rationale
to hold that a confession not delivered in open court is not admissible
into evidence. This, however, the Court has reasonably declined to do
on the ground that interrogation, of itself, does not unduly undermine
the procedural safeguards of the trial. But as long as some confessions
are admissible, then distinctions must be drawn in each case. The Court
could make the drawing of these distinctions a simpler matter if it were
to transmute the elements of police conduct which the Court now considers relevant to a determination of subjective involuntariness into objective prerequisites to admissibility. The McNabb rule is a step in this
direction by the federal courts in considering the effect of prolonged
detention.80 A similar rule might hold that where a confession is obtained without counsel present it is inadmissible. 8' But if each of the
elements leading to a finding of coercion were transmuted into objective
prerequisites of admissibility, then the purpose would shift from one of
ensuring procedural safeguards to one of deterrence. A confession would
be inadmissible in a particular case even though its admission might not
jeopardize the fairness of the particular defendant's trial. Rather, the
confession would be excluded because of the presence of practices so
likely to go hand in hand with coercion that they must not be encouraged. The search and seizure and confession exclusionary rules
would then rest on the same theoretical base. But this would be a more
radical step than might at first appear. Although doubts have been expressed about the deterrent efficacy of Mapp v. Ohio,8 2 compliance re80 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957). This rule holds confessions obtained from a suspect during a period of

detention in violation of FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a) inadmissible in federal criminal proceedings. A number of commentators, inspired largely by Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961), have suggested that the Court has already applied the McNabb
rule to the states. See Ritz, supra note 54, at 70; Comment to Article 45, TENTATIVE
FINAL

DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED ILLINOIS

CODE

OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

109

(1963);

Comment, 24 GA. B.J. 120 (1961); Note, 75 HARv. L. REV. 158 (1961); Comment, 68

YALE L.J. 1003 (1959). Two of the Justices have urged extension of the McNabb rule
to the states. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 443, 448 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring); Gallegos
v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 73-75 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
81 Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), has inspired the suggestion that such a
rule already exists. See Note, 76 HARV. L. Rv. 108 (1962). Mr. Justice Douglas urges
such a rule but it is unclear whether or not he would require that a request for counsel be made. Compare Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 641 (1961) ("I believe
that the denial of petitioner's request that he be given the right of counsel was a
violation of his constitutional rights.') (Douglas, J., concurring), with Reck v. Pate,
367 U.S. 433, 448 (1961) ("I would hold that any confession obtained by the police
while the defendant is under detention is inadmissible, unless . . . the accused is
* accorded an opportunity to consult counsel.") (Douglas, J., concurring).
82 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Re-
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quires only that the police obtain a warrant. A rational allocation of
police resources would not call for a program of unreasonable-and
hence, almost by definition, largely fruitless-searches. But in the large
majority of cases a requirement of prompt arraignment and counsel
would make interrogation fruitless. A pervasive characteristic of the
coerced confession cases is that they involve unwitnessed crimes of violence8 3 which leave little physical evidence. Yet these are the very crimes
which most strongly affect the community's sense of security. If the Court
chooses to foreclose the admission of confessions altogether, or to raise
the requirements of prompt arraignment and counsel to rigid prerequisites of admissibility, then law enforcement officials might be unable
to obtain convictions of those responsible for these crimes. In formulating
constitutional rules governing the admissibility of confessions, the Court
should consider that requirements which would render interrogation ineffective might immunize this class of criminals from the criminal
process.
quiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 37-39. Professor Allen points out that in dealing
with the type of organized, sumptuary crime which is often the target of illegal searches,
the police may not desire to obtain actual convictions. "Under such circumstances, the
conviction of defendants may not be the only, or even the most important, objective
of police action. . . . Putting aside all question of corruption or improper political
pressure, the police may permit themselves policies of "prevention" and harassment,
involving the range of traditional illegalities from illegal detention of persons to unauthorized destruction of property. The threat of the exclusionary rule is likely to
have little potency here, for these police activities are not pursued with criminal prosecution as the end in view." Id. at 39.
83 The thirty-three state coerced confession cases include 25 convictions for murder,
4 for rape, 2 for robbery, 1 for manslaughter, and 1 for unlawful possession and sale
of marijuana.

